Resisting sex/gender conflation: a rejoinder to John Hood-Williams by Archer, Robert
Resisting sex/gender conflation: a
rejoinder to John Hood-Williams
Robert Willmott
Abstract
The irony of the rejection of the sex/gender distinction is that it ren-
ders sociology per se an impossible enterprise. For it is my submission
that, contra Hood-Williams (1996) and others, the biological and the
social constitute distinct, irreducible levels of reality: to conflate (in a
'downwards' or 'upwards' direction) the two levels is immediately to
render analysis of their relative interplay at best intractable. It is
indeed arguable that Hood-Williams is not so much concerned with
(rightly) rejecting the so-called 'additive' approach to the biological
and the social where the biological base is seen a priori as immutable,
but more fundamentally with rejecting the necessary dualism of nature
and culture (ie the biological and the social). In contradistinction, a
realist defence of the sex/gender distinction will be made, involving
critical reference to various major writers in the field and offering a
brief but tentative discussion of the provenance of gender.
Introduction
As Lynda Birke points out, feminists have rightly become con-
cerned with biology (sex) because gender (social) differences have
almost invariably been conceptualised in biological terms. Indeed,
women have often been (and are) depicted as passive victims of
their biology in ways that men, generally speaking, have not:
women are portrayed as possessing an 'underlying biological
nature, an essence of femininity, which provides constraints on
what is individually possible for them. The social position of
women thus becomes seen as determined - and limited - by their
biology' (Birke, 1986: 2). Intrinsic to the latter is the necessity of
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analytically separating the social and the biological; in other
words, the indispensability of adopting the now-famous sex/gen-
der distinction. This important distinction was popularised by
Ann Oakley who, in 1972, wrote that '(s)ex is a biological term;
"gender" a psychological and cultural one' (Oakley, 1972: 158).
Birke is rightly critical of the way in which the notion of natural
sex difference has been utilised particularly in political debates
vis-d-vis gender inequality to assert that men and women are ulti-
mately different, thereby closing off further discussion and more-
over legitimating extant gender inequalities. Essentially, Birke is
getting at the fact that we are dealing with two levels of reality
which are irreducible by virtue of the fact that one can criticise
ideas about biological differences. This is precluded by conflation.
Throughout this paper my main concern will be with defending
the analytical indispensability of the ontological sex/gender dis-
tinction. Thus, to claim that we are necessarily dealing with two
levels - the dynamic interplay of which is central to the feminist
enterprise - is fundamentally to make an ontological claim;
namely one that recognises that reality is quintessentially strati-
fied. This is to adopt a realist position, viz. that the social is emer-
gent from the biological and that moreover each level possesses
irreducible powers (which may remain unexercised) that interact
and thus require analytical separation (ie the adoption of analyti-
cal dualism) in order to examine their relative efficacy.' The fact
that the social and the biological interact and mutually influence
certainly does not entail the abandonment of the (ontological)
distinction. It merely means that methodologically speaking, soci-
ological life is not as simple as we would like! Indeed, as Hood-
Williams notes, there are real difficulties in assigning the relative
causal efficacy of each level, but it does not follow that the dis-
tinction should be abandoned on the basis of such difficulty
(Hood-Williams, 1996: 14). As Sayer argues, '(t)here are also
cases . . . in which the biological may be socially mediated in
every instance and respect, but this does not mean that what is
mediated cannot be biological. Whether people are "naturally"
aggressive, or males, or patriarchal or whatever can only be
decided by research which pays careful attention to stratification
and emergence and is alive to the problems of defining the 'natural'
and the 'social' (Sayer, 1992: 121). Any conflationary approach to
the study of gender and in particular gender inequalities immedi-
ately renders the feminist enterprise impotent. For not to acknow-
ledge that the social and the biological constitute emergent levels
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of reality violates our inherent ability qua agents to delineate pos-
sibilities for socio-cultural and economic change. Indeed, without
the important recognition that gender is not heuristically but
ontologically distinct from biology, that is, to admit the existence
of a particularly efficacious cultural/ideological property, then
logically sociology per se is a non-starter.
We are compelled inexorably to distinguish between sex and
gender, for gender, qua ideology derived from biological differ-
ences, has been and indeed continues to be wielded for the benefit
of men contra women. Indeed, contra Hood-Williams and others,
it is precisely because of the relative efficacy of ideology that we
can, or rather must, acknowledge the dualism of nature and cul-
ture. For as Popper pointed out, ideologies are quintessentially
the product of human minds, but qua product they acquire an
ontological status of their own, in turn rendering them indepen-
dent of knowing subjects (Popper, 1979; 1994). To reiterate, a
wholly non-conflationary approach is intrinsic to the sex/gender
distinction. Given that the social and the biological are so mutu-
ally influential, one would have expected 'central conflation' to
have been the most attractive, though nonetheless fallacious, the-
oretical position for some writers to adopt. However, this is not
the case. There are those writers (feminist and non-feminist alike)
whom I would label 'upwards conflationists', since they would
want to eradicate gender by arguing that cultural differences are
really natural; but more conspicuous amongst the theoretical fold
are those whom one can quite legitimately label 'downwards con-
flationists'. Downwards conflation has proved to be quite attrac-
tive to a growing number of writers (particularly those of a
post-modernist/post-structuralist hue, including Hood-Williams),
Thus to Laqueur, 'there has been a powerful tendency among
feminists to empty sex of its content by arguing that natural dif-
ferences are really cultural. In Gayle Rubin's account . . . the
presence of the body is so veiled as to be almost hidden. Sherry
Ortner and Harriet Whitehead further erode the body's priority
over language with their self-conscious use of quotation marks
around "given" . . . [and furthermore] Gender to Joan Scott , , .
is not a category that mediates between fixed biological difference
on the one hand and historically contingent social relations on
the other' (Laquer, 1994; 12). And thus, as Laqueur rightly points
out, the distinction between nature and culture collapses as the
former folds into the latter. Whilst Laqueur is absolutely right to
argue that we must not conflate the body and the social context
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('the fact we become human in culture . . . does not give us
licence to ignore the body'), non-conflationists would conceivably
want to place a question mark over his assertion of the fixity of
the body within the extant socio-cultural milieu. It seems that
Laqueur is endorsing the so-called 'additive' conceptualisation of
the relationship between the biological and the social, where the
biological base assumes primacy. This ultimately precludes the
possibility of a two-way interplay.
Moreover, it could be argued that Laqueur ultimately follows
the downwards path of idealist-inflected conflationism, as will be
discussed. He rightly endorses the important (ontological)
sex/gender distinction and indeed emphasises the considerable effi-
cacy of gender ideology when he writes, for example, that 'theo-
ries of sexual difference influenced the course of scientific progress
and the interpretation of particular experimental results' (1994:
16). However, this, I will argue, is vitiated slightly by ontological
confusion which in turn could be used contra Laqueur by adher-
ents of conflation. In a similar vein, Nelly Oudshoorn (1994) has
splendidly delineated the way in which gender filters through
extensively to the scientific world where the natural body was
taken as axiomatic, and how endocrinologists in particular even-
tually contradict the deeply-entrenched notion of a clear, irre-
ducible demarcation between men and women. Oudshoorn does
not wish to dispense with the sex/gender distinction. Her substan-
tive criticism is directed at those feminists who, in utilising the
distinction, 'did not question the biological sex of those subjects
that became socialized a woman; they took sex and the body for
granted as unchanging biological realities that needed no further
explanation . . . the concept of sex maintained its status as an
ahistorical attribute of the human body and the body remained
excluded from feminist analysis' (1994: 2-3). However, the exact
utility of the distinction is left to be discerned by the reader and
in fact one gets the distinct impression that Oudshoorn, like
Laqueur, ventures unwittingly down the path of conflationism, as
exemplified by her endorsement of the constructivist approach to
the study of science and scientists. My ontological concerns vis-a-
vis Laqueur and Oudshoorn will be discussed at a later stage in
the paper.
It should be clear from the foregoing that I unequivocally
endorse the view that gender is perhaps best conceptualised as
ideational in nature (pertaining to the propositional register of
society, which is utilised/manipulated socio-culturally) and is in
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some way intimately (though not arbitrarily) related to biology:
both constitute distinct, irreducible levels of reality. However, as
well as maintaining this ontological distinction, I further want to
proffer an explanation, albeit tentatively, as to why women have
been oppressed (more so than men) via the articulation of the
material (economic) and the ideational (socio-cultural; anchored
in objective biology). Despite Delphy's untenable ontological
proposition that gender precedes sex (since logically ideas emerge
from, and are thus posterior to, the body), her emphasis on the
social division of labour is important, but not elaborated: the pre-
cise linkage between the biological and the exigencies of capital-
ism are not enunciated by Delphy (1993). Consequently, I will
briefly draw on Alison Assiter's work, in which she posits three
broad preconditions for gender inequality (Assiter, 1992). Indeed,
not to incorporate the material realities of women's existence
would necessarily vitiate my defence of the sex/gender distinction
which is the ontological springboard for an adequate sociology of
anything, for the very possibility of sociology is predicated four-
square on the existence of events, objects and processes which
occur or exist independently of human conception. All sociology
is underpinned by philosophical assumptions and thus it is neces-
sary that sociologists are fully cognisant of their (often implicit)
philosophical underpinnings.
The indispensability of the ontological sex/gender distinction
As already mentioned, the distinction has been employed by such
feminist writers as Birke to critique biological reductionism.
Assertions regarding the (putative) naturalness of gender differ-
ences are often intended to mean that the trait is biologically
determined, that is, pre-ordained by nature. Hence the prevalent
notion that women, above all, 'naturally' want to be mothers
because of a supposedly intrinsic maternal instinct - it is in their
biological make-up to do so. Alice Rossi claims that gender differ-
ences are directly determined by biology; she argues for the
importance of 'innate factors' in fostering the mother-child rela-
tionship and, moreover, contends that pre-natal hormonal influ-
ences predispose children to learn 'socially defined appropriate
gender behaviour' (Sayers, 1982: 152). She concludes that 'there
may be a biologically based potential for heightened maternal
involvement in the child . . . that exceeds the potential for invest-
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ment by men in fatherhood' (1982: 152). Contra Rossi, if gender
differences are intrinsically biological and thus immutable, why is
it that children learn 'socially defined appropriate gender behav-
iour'? If everything social could be reduced to (or is reducible to)
the biological then logically there would be no predispositional
hormones: either hormones determine or they do not! Whether
there may be a biologically-based potential for heightened mater-
nal investment is irrelevant, since it is the case that mothers and
fathers are equally nurturant (1982: 153).
Furthermore, vis-d-vis sexuality, women are deemed (stereotypi-
cally) to be passive and receptive, men active and aggressive; a
dichotomy which is attributed to underlying biological differ-
ences. However, the notion of an underlying biological urge to
account for the latter is wholly incongruous with the way in
which sexuality has been (and is) expressed cross-culturally and
historically. Thus to Birke, '(p)ositing some underlying biological
urge cannot usefully explain something as rich and varied as
human sexual expression' (Birke, 1986: 13). The issue of male
violence is often taken to be the ineluctable result of innate bio-
logical differences. It has been suggested that women are 'prone
to violence' and that women subjected to male violence become
addicted to what Pizzey and Shapiro call 'hormonal highs' as a
result of the high level of 'stress' hormones released during a vio-
lent confrontation. The latter is an extreme form of biological
determinism where ultimately the victim (ie, women) is blamed.
Essentially, Pizzey and Shapiro fail to emphasise that it is quin-
tessentially an issue of male violence towards women; they refer
only to genderless people (1986: 34). The many social reasons for
the fact that some women find themselves in such violent situa-
tions are completely ignored by Pizzey and Shapiro. And as
Connell has pointed out, insofar as psychologists have been suc-
cessful in measuring such traits as aggressiveness, 'a great deal of
overlap between women and men is exactly what they found'
(Connell, 1987: 70).
The principal inherent problem with the above is the palpable
lack of acknowledgement that human action is highly structured
in a collective sense. As Connell argues, it is constituted interac-
tively, 'not by context-free individual predispositions . . . The idea
that differences in hormone levels reach out through the complex
situational, personal and collective determinants of individual
behaviour . . . supposes a mechanism of hormonal control far
more powerful than psychological research has actually found'
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(1987: 71). Furthermore, as Oudshoom points out, by 1940 bio-
chemists had persuaded their colleagues (though not all scientists)
that the production of female and male sex hormones was not
restricted to one sex and that in fact they even subsequently
proposed to overthrow the entire concept of sex hormones
(Oudshoorn and Wijngaard, 1991: 462-3). In the latter, we clearly
have an ontological hiatus: the biological (bodily/hormonal func-
tions) is distinct from the social (notion that sex-specific hor-
mones determine behaviour). And so without the sex/gender
distinction we would not be able to proffer a critically-discursive
account of, for example, the so-called 'Baby M' case in the
United States, for in this particular case (involving a reneged sur-
rogacy contract) a link was made by the Courts between repro-
ductive (female) bodies and irrationality. As Smart points out, the
body of the biological father does not enter the Courts in the
same way as the biological mother's: the father's body, in con-
tradistinction to the mother's, is not a cultural signifier of nega-
tive meanings (Smart, 1989: 103). To reiterate, then, unless we
can make the distinction we cannot ever hope to explicate the
complexity and variability of patriarchy/androcentrism, that is,
the ways in which women generally have been (and are) devalued
and excluded to the benefit of (most) men.
The distinction is thus a major part of the feminist armoury in
the ongoing fight against biological reductionism and the funda-
mentally inegalitarian precepts that have followed from it.
Notwithstanding, the distinction clearly has substantive concomi-
tant political functions. With the distinction, it is possible to claim
that in criticising masculinity (with its patriarchal/androcentric
connotations especially), one is not perforce rejecting or aiming to
expunge biological maleness, or all people of the male sex (one
hopes!); and similarly for women. Thus, one is now in a position
to pinpoint what is changeable and what is not in the context of
socio-economic reality.
Conflationist objections: some realist rejoinders
One of the most compelling but ultimately specious objections
raised against the sex/gender distinction is the putative division
between the fluidity of the social and the unchanging biological
which the distinction seems to presuppose. Nelly Oudshoom has
cogently delineated the way in which scientific classification of
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hormones according to sex was greatly influenced by /»re-scientific
ideas about men and women: 'the idea that the male gonads are
the seat of masculinity is a very old one. From the earliest times,
the testis has been linked with male sexuality, longevity and brav-
ery. Greeks and Romans used preparations made from goat or
wolf testes as sexual stimulants . . . in the seventeenth century . . .
the pre-scientific idea of testes as agents of masculinity became
for the first time incorporated into medical science' (Oudshoom,
1994: 117-118). Basically, Oudshoom, in her analysis of the scien-
tific discovery of hormones, has convincingly demonstrated the
untenability of the notion of distinct, unchanging biological differ-
ences between men and women. The original assumption (which
was predicated wholly on the largely-accepted two-sex model)
that each sex could be recognised by its own sex hormones was
gradually replaced by a model in which male and female sex hor-
mones are present in both sexes. This did not, however, result in
the abandonment of the pervasive notion that there exist only
two irreducible sexes.
Yet moreover sex-specific hormone ideologues cannot now
retreat to the initial assertion of ineradicable sex differences on
the basis of genital structure, for as Birke rightly emphasises,
'even here the differences are not absolute, and some individuals
are born with ambiguous genitals [. . .] So, to state that a differ-
ence is not absolute is to say that there is some degree of overlap'
(Birke, 1992: 83). As Hood-Williams would want to rightly
emphasise, there is thus a variety of hormonal conditions which
occur in individuals who are genetically male or genetically female
which occasionally results in an overlap between 'male' and
'female' physical types. Kaplan and Rogers have thus concluded
that the 'rigid either/or assignment of the sexes is only a conve-
nient social construct, not a biological reality' (Kaplan and
Rogers, 1990: 214). It is therefore the case that the biological cri-
teria constitutive of sex are not always congruent, and this in turn
renders the notion of two distinct genders problematic.
Consequently, it is hardly surprising that the ideology of only-
two-genders has conspicuous causal efficacy vis-a-vis the body.
Indeed, in order to render incongruent biological facts cotermi-
nous with the rigid, two-gender dichotomy, medicine has, as Julia
Epstein points out, developed a technology for removing ambigui-
ties with surgical and hormonal intervention, which as a result
has permitted the maintenance of a legal fiction of binary gender
as an absolute (Epstein, 1990: 128-9).
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What, then, are the implications of the above for the sex/gender
distinction? It is clear from the foregoing that, as Oudshoorn et
al. would most certainly want to emphasise, we are not simply
dealing with two ahistorical, fixed male and female biologies.
However, this does not, contra Jaggar (1984) and Hood-Williams
(1996), automatically render the distinction analytically defunct.
In fact, Oudshoorn, as already mentioned, wants to retain the dis-
tinction, but does not reorient her work accordingly which she
should have done given her corrective to earlier feminist writings
that took for granted an ahistorical, two-sex model. Conse-
quently, she emphasises the social construction (largely on the
part of scientists) of the 'natural' body; an accentuation which
arguably has some resonance with downwards conflation. This
will be elucidated in a moment. Essentially, the above discussion
on the constitutive nature of sex evinces the need for one to
employ the sex/gender distinction with analytical precision, not an
abandonment. It could only be abandoned if it could be held that
sex and gender did not interact; clearly they do!
Crucially, the sex/gender distinction does not ineluctably entail
that we must restrict ourselves only to two genders or two sexes.
As Val Plumwood argues, '(a)lthough we should view human sex-
ual reproduction in the light of an account of general biological
reproduction, which is dimorphic, it seems equally clear that the
Western view of gender as dimorphic has in turn influenced the
theory. The evidential support basis . . . really only provides a
basis for saying that there must be at least two sexes, not that
there must be exactly two sexes and no more' (Plumwood, 1989:
4-5). Indeed, Oudshoorn herself reaches the conclusion that dur-
ing the period endocrinology developed it might have been per-
fectly possible to introduce a classification of multiple sexes.
Given that we are not dealing merely with two irreducible
male/female biologies whose putative dimorphism underpins two
genders, Plumwood states that there are 'fuzzy areas' of overlap
between the biological and the social, and that consequently the
sex/gender distinction should not be treated as sharply exclusive;
there is an absence of a sharp boundary whose 'fuzziness' does
not constitute grounds for abandoning the distinction.
Regrettably, Plumwood is arguably falling into the trap of
conflation. There is no 'fuzzy overlap', as she puts it: this is not
simply a conceptual impossibility but an ontological impossibility.
Rather, there is interaction. To assert the simultaneity of interac-
tion and overlap is contradictory. For if the biological and the
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social have autonomy (the edifice upon which the sex/gender dis-
tinction stands), then to posit an overlap is to withdraw auton-
omy from both levels since analytical separation remains ever
intractable. Thus, 'overlap' ultimately precludes methodological
unpacking of the duality, thereby greatly reducing, if not expung-
ing, the explanatory purchase of the feminist-inspired sex/gender
distinction. However, to be fair, Plumwood does go on to discuss
how certain cultures systematically endeavour to eliminate biologi-
cal overlap (see also Epstein, 1990) which, she rightly maintains,
is a result of 'a conceptual feedback of gender structures into sex-
ual ones' (Plumwood, 1989: 5). It may simply be that Plumwood
has absentmindedly inserted the untenable proposition that the
biological and the social overlap (and thereby conflated).
However, it is important to reiterate that the two interact and to
recognise, as Plumwood does, that the independent (ie, logically
anterior to) reality of biology qua non-/7a«dimorphic entity is
impinged upon, remoulded by, the social context. The salient
point is not to lose sight of the fact that once embroiled in socio-
economic reality, the body/biology does not lose autonomy. This
is a tempting slippage and one which must be sedulously avoided.
The point I want to labour, then, is that the body is ontologi-
cally distinct from, and irreducible to, its socio-cultural entangle-
ment. As Judith Butler rightly points out, 'nature has a history,
and not merely a social one' (Butler, 1993: 5). Here, Butler is
arguing, albeit unwittingly, for the self-subsistent reality of nature
which exists independently of human conception/existence. I want
to take this a stage further in order to highlight some ontological
deficiencies vis-d-vis Oudshoom and Laqueur, both of whom
anchor their respective oeuvres in the sex/gender distinction. It is
fundamental that we explicitly recognise that the human body,
viz. its biochemical properties, functions, etc., is not dependent
upon/reducible to human conceptualisation. In other words, I am
not disclaiming that the body has been (ideologically) miscon-
strued (as in Oudshoorn's lucid analysis of the genesis of
endocrinology, for example), but that this social process of mis-
construal does not mean that there is not a real (and therefore
natural) body whose hormonal constituents inter alia exist inde-
pendently of our construction. To assume otherwise is to endorse
idealist-inflected downwards conflation.
One gets the impression that this important ontological distinc-
tion is obfuscated in both authors' work. Oudshoom confidently
writes that 'there does not exist an unmediated, natural truth of
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the body. Our perceptions and interpretations of the body are
mediated through language' (Oudshoom, 1994: 3). Her first
remark is only correct in the context of her study of the way in
which gender ideology affected the way in which the body was
deemed to function (dimorphically) and influence/determine gen-
der-specific behaviour. But one cannot deny a priori an objective
natural biology (which on the whole is dimorphic). To do so is to
reduce ontology to epistemology, thereby committing the epis-
temic fallacy.̂  Gender ideology clearly affected the interpretations
of the discovery of hormones, but this in itself does not affect the
reality of hormones! Importantly, there is a truth of the body, or
rather bodies, human knowledge of which is fallibilistic. Ouds-
hoom should have made this distinction, for it clearly buttresses
the indispensability of the sex/gender distinction in showing that
within a socio-cultural context, meanings, interpretations, signi-
fiers, are basically given to us and are thus not natural. This in
turn necessitates an analysis of how they are given and moreover
why. The why-qassiion will be addressed later. (And hopefully
will answer Hood-Williams' question of why gender ideology has
been produced in relation to objective biology.)
Similarly, Thomas Laqueur, though successfully employing the
sex/gender distinction in his careful analysis of biological/social
interaction from the Greeks onwards, also rejects the important
realist notion of an independent, self-subsistent natural reality.
Thus he writes: 'Anatomy, and nature as we know it more gener-
ally, is obviously not pure fact, unadulterated by thought or con-
vention . .,.' (Laqueur 1994: 163). Again, anatomy is pure fact;
what is not pure fact is the way in which its objective existence is
socio-culturally manipulated. Laqueur should be more careful to
eschew committing the same error as those downwards confia-
tionists he rightly castigates! Indeed, the one-sex model was
grounded in natural differences and such differences were ideolog-
ically concealed via socio-cultural manipulation with, as Laqueur
points out, considerable logical inconsistency. The salient point,
which is not adequately teased out by Laqueur, is that such
logical inconsistency was not of any substantive social import
because socio-cultural power was employed by men to diminish
its potential importance. Thus, it is my contention that while
there is biological overlap, men and women are ontologically distin-
guished by their respective reproductive capacities (though men and
women are fundamentally not qualitatively different kinds of
people), and that it is this objective fact - which pace Hood-
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Williams was socio-culturally misrepresented by the Greeks et al.
- that has particular social salience. The social importance of this
objectivity is exemplified by the ostensibly natural imperative to
rectify the 'anomaly' of hermaphroditism, remove facial hair on
the part of women, etc. This is the two-way interplay which needs
to be theorised in terms of stringency of constraints/degrees of
freedom.
Although Hood-Williams rightly enjoins that we must not
ignore the importance of the human body (Hood-Williams, 1996:
14), this is somewhat negated by his idealist-inflected adherence of
downwards conflation. For he clearly wants the reader to concur
that 'both sex and gender are social' (1996: 12). This is untenable.
Certainly, as he points out, ideology affected the scientific classifl-
cation of chromosomes, but the existence of chromosomes is not
ontologically dependent upon human beings' knowledge; and
moreover, he does not seem to want to accept that there are mini-
mally-necessary biological factors that enable us to identity a par-
ticular body as male or female. It is not being disclaimed that
such biological properties need not be unchanging (although there
are obvious limits to change), but, as Assiter succinctly argues,
'(t)here is a minimally necessary set of bodily or biological fea-
tures present in every female, features the presence of which
enables us to identify the person as female. This set will consist in
some combination of chromosomes, genitalia and secondary sex
characteristics. This forms the "real essence" or the nature of the
kind "female" in something closely akin to a Lockean sense. The
real essence properties of a kind being essential does not imply
that they are fixed by nature' (Assiter, 1996: 125).
Briefly, a further and splendid example of downwards confla-
tion is provided by the philosopher Elizabeth Grosz. For Grosz
the ontological distinction between the biological and the social is
wholly untenable. Grosz denies that there is a real body on the
one hand, and its various cultural and historical representations
on the other. Thus to Grosz: '[i]t is my claim . . . that these repre-
sentations and cultural inscriptions quite literally constitute bodies
and help to produce them as such' (Grosz, 1994: x). Inadequate
ontological presuppositions have led her to follow the downwards
path of conflation. Grosz is rightly critical of the Cartesian
mind/body dualism, but her 'solution' remains ever elusive given
her irrealist stance. The only way of resolving the Cartesian dual-
ism, and thus avoiding Grosz's elusive 'somewhere-in-the-middle'
approach (1994: xii), is explicitly to acknowledge that reality is
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intrinsically stratified. Here, then, the mind is emergent from the
body, just as the social is emergent from the conjunction of other
minds (ie, people). We thus have the following ontological
schema: body > mind > social > further emergent social strata.
But importantly, this stratified schema/model does not presuppose
that one stratum automatically has causal primacy. And further-
more, we don't have to work back through all the successive con-
stitutive strata in order to understand objects in any specific
stratum (Sayer, 1992: 120).
Grosz's somewhere-in-the-middle approach is the ineluctable
corollary of not conceptualising reality in terms of stratification
and emergence. It is hardly surprising that this lack of a stratifica-
tion model has led to ontological contradiction. For, as men-
tioned above, Grosz states that the body exists only by virtue of
its socio-cultural signification/recognition, yet in the next breath
writes that '(i)t is not adequate to simply dismiss the category of
nature outright, to completely retranscribe it without residue into
the cultural' (Grosz, 1994: 21). But, of course, the natural is logi-
cally distinct and irreducible to the social, thereby conceding the
realist's case that we are dealing with levels of reality. The fact
that we are dealing with distinct levels of reality is evident in a
further comment relating to bodies: '(p)art of their own "nature"
is an organic or ontological "incompleteness" or lack of finality,
an amenability to social completion, social ordering and organiza-
tion' (1994: xi), for here Grosz is again conceding that the two
are ontologically distinct. In fact, this is in transparent contradic-
tion of her initial contentious assertion that the body does not
exist without socio-cultural signification, for Grosz is now arguing
that it is not 'fully' real until it has been socio-culturally
'inscribed'! The fundamental point that Grosz has not yet grasped
is that the biological and the social are constitutive levels of a
duality, where analytical dualism {not Cartesian dualism) can be
invoked to examine their interplay.
It should be clear that sex (biology) is not subject to just any
old change and that gender is not wholly amenable to change:
both can (and should) be conceptualised as susceptible to some
change. And so the distinction is quintessentially not a distinction
between the unchangeable and the readily/easily changeable.
Indeed, as Epstein has shown, it is easier to change (given the
current socio-economic configuration) the facts of biology than it
is to change those of gender! Importantly, however, one cannot
assume a priori that the 'facts' of gender are intrinsically more
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amenable to change than those of biology: their differential muta-
bility has to be examined empirically/historically within the
matrix of structure, culture and agency. Moreover, it does not
follow from the fact that gender is not determined by sex that it
therefore "fioats" free in this strong sense of being an unrelated
addition, or that the body is taken to be neutral in the sense of
not favouring any possible social meaning over any other'
(Plumwood, 1989: 6). Indeed, in the next (final) section, I want to
argue that it is precisely because of the respective reproductive
capacities of men and women (ontology limiting the range of pos-
sible interpretations) which has skewed a specific (inegalitarian)
interpretation/construction given the conjunction of material real-
ity in which we are all compelled to live.
Gender: its provenance
It has been argued that sex and gender are not just analytically
distinct but ontologically so, and that confiation in any direction
vitiates the sociological enterprise. My position is thus wholly
antithetical to post-modernist approaches to gender, ie, contra
post-Lacanian psychoanalysis, Derridean deconstruction and
Foucauldian genealogy.^ Indeed, confiation would necessarily pre-
clude an analysis of, inter alia, the interplay between capitalist
(phannaceutical) interests vis-d-vis the pill and their well-
documented deleterious effects on women; in vitro fertilisation;
parenting; and so on. Clearly, therefore, gender is not simply
'added ' to an underlying, fixed, ahistorical body. This so-called
'additive model' rightly recognises the importance of the social
and the biological, but it wrongly presupposes a flxed, underlying
biology onto which social factors are added. One of the main
problems, as Connell points out, is that the model fails to take
into account that people find important in the experience of sex
and gender; and the correct relative weighing of social versus bio-
logical determination is never accurately established (Connell,
1987: 74).
Before moving on to Plumwood's conceptualisation of gender
vis-d-vis the body, I again want to voice an ontological objection.
In rightly criticising the 'additive model', she interestingly writes
that 'there can be no pure "sex" or purely detachable biology
which can occur without social elaboration" (Plumwood, 1989: 7).
But what about Robinson Crusoe? Does it follow that because he
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was palpably asocial he did not have a biology? Naturally I
accept that we are indeed bom into a social context which we
necessarily confront, but the point is that we are dealing with two
irreducible levels of reality, with the biological not ontologically
dependent upon social signification. If we cannot 'detach' the two,
then how can we examine their interplay over time? The obdurate
social imperialist, like Grosz, would conceivably retort that
Crusoe came from a social context, which in turn remained with
him, qua memory traces. But this is fundamentally to miss the
point, for it remains possible for Crusoe (and indeed socially-
embedded beings) to have non-social relations with non-social real-
ity. If one accepts the latter then one has to accept that society is
not the gatekeeper of the whole world, and that consequently
biology inter alia has an independent existence which in itself pro-
vides the human being with a non-social sense of self. Indeed,
direct interaction with the otherness of nature is necessarily prior
to being able to distinguish social others (Archer, 1995: 290). I
suppose the basic problem for some feminist philosophers is that
because we are socially embedded, it is subsequently forgotten or
rather denied that biology constitutes a distinct stratum of reality
which must not be rendered epiphenomenal vis-a-vis other emer-
gent strata. Nonetheless, Plumwood concludes that 'gender
involves a story (theory) about sex. Our own Western Story,
shared social fantasy, has until recently been difficult to see
because it was so basic and so little questioned . . . " (Plumwood,
1989: 8). At a basic level this is quite unobjectionable, but it does
indeed beg the question why a particular 'story' or 'shared social
fantasy' legitimates/underpins fundamental inequalities between
women and men. This is not addressed by Plumwood.
In) an interesting and plausible piece on the origins of gender
ideology and concomitant inequality, Alison Assiter notes that
while biological differences provide insufficient grounds for
inequality, 'surely the fact that women bear the children is a dif-
ference of sufficient magnitude to give rise to an inequality.
Women bear children. They are also biologically fitted for rearing
them for long periods during the first few months . . . The mother
provides the milk. These facts about the mother-child relation-
ship, though they do not make it necessarily true that this will be
the case, surely make it more likely that women will tend to have
a greater responsibility than men' (Assiter, 1992: 78). Assiter is
not endorsing the view that only women are intrinsically suited to
childrearing; rather this is likely to be ideologically deemed so
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because of their biology and its place within the materiality of
existence. Therefore, in class societies people upon birth are not
able to choose their social class and, of course, their sex; and
moreover a surplus must be extracted and the 'producing class' be
reproduced. Thus, '(g)iven human biology, it is not surprising
that these two functions have, often, in the history of capitalism
been assigned to different sexes. Working-class males, serfs, etc.
have "gone out" to work; females . . . have frequently worked in
the home' (1992: 79).
Consequently, in such capitalist societies especially, the exist-
ence of groups of which membership is largely pre-determined is
taken as axiomatic and, concomitantly, buttresses the 'belief that
one group will 'naturally' be fitted to certain work. In summaris-
ing, Assiter posits three broad preconditions for gender inequal-
ity: 1) the 'biological data'; 2) the use of such data in particular
contexts, including class societies; and 3) the way in which the
biological data are viewed - the ideological factor (1992: 79).
Thus, to take but one example, without the sex/gender distinction,
whose provenance I have somewhat briefly endeavoured to
ground materially, one would not be able to proffer an analysis
of the apparent world-wide preference for male offspring, which
has led to sex-selection, the ramifications of which include infanti-
cide. In this example, ideology results in successful biological
regulation, which in turn reinforces male domination and the
'natural' superiority of men, who, by virtue of their structural
position within capitalism, perpetuate, and benefit from, this ide-
ology. Here we have a two-way interplay, whose separation is
fundamental to the feminist enterprise.
Concluding remarks
It has been argued that there is an important ontological distinc-
tion between the social and the biological: the two interact, but
do not overlap. Thus, pace Kaplan and Rogers, we are not exclu-
sively concerned with 'a convenient social construct'. It is indeed
convenient for men, but the story-telling does not end there. To
over-accentuate the social (often at the expense of the biological)
is commit the fallacy of (downwards) conflation, a theoretical ten-
dency which Oudshoom rightly berated in her critique of early
feminist writings. Conflationism in all its guises is intrinsically
antithetical to sociology in toto. For if we cannot separate the
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biological, the social, the material, then logically we will never be
able to theorise about their interplay and hence nullify our capac-
ity to pinpoint possibilities for social change. Gender is thus ideo-
logical, for it obfuscates the (unnecessary) reality of inequalities.
Its antecedents, I have intimated, are materially grounded, but
once ideationally registered, so to speak, such ideas react back, as
evidenced in the current and ever-expanding array of technologies
designed to 'rectify', 'help' or 'cure'. Indeed, the new reproductive
technology, for example, has been considered by some feminists
to constitute a locus for struggle over women's autonomy,
whereby economic and professional interests, pro-natalist ideol-
ogy, etc., interact (Strickler, 1992). Such an analysis would logi-
cally be impossible without the ontological sex/gender distinction.
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Notes
1 For purposes of brevity, I am using the social and the biological as portman-
teau terms to cover the fact that both realities are stratified, with no a priori
limit placed on the number of emergent strata.
2 That is, statements about being can be reduced to statements about our know-
ledge of being, which in turn can (and often does) lead to anthropocentrism.
3 For a brief discussion, see Diana Coole, 'The Gendered Self, in D. Backhurst
and C. Sypnovich (eds). The Social Self, Sage, 1995, pp. 123-139.
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